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Nudge politics capitalize on psychologi-
cal insights on human behavior to inform
central policies. The scope for such poli-
cies to bring about large improvements
in individual behavior for relatively little
cost has captured the imagination of gov-
ernments worldwide. “Nudging” involves
using choice architecture—the ways deci-
sions are framed or presented—to modify
choosers’ behavior (Thaler and Sunstein,
2008). The common assumption that peo-
ple always make optimal decisions for
themselves when provided with accurate
information has been proven false in
several contexts. Instead, people’s deci-
sions are often influenced by the context
in which they are made. For example,
people often overvalue immediate rela-
tive to long-term prospects, get stuck in
harmful habits and are disproportionately
inclined to copy the behavior of oth-
ers in their social group, even to their
detriment (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
Nudges can be used to help people to
overcome these tendencies. For exam-
ple, they might help people save toward
their pension, to choose healthier food
options or to reduce their energy con-
sumption, amongst other things (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008). Nudges are ostensi-
bly paternalistic in that they help people to
make decisions that are in their best inter-
est (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2008). At
the same time, nudges are also libertar-
ian, in that they preserve freedom of choice
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2008). Here, I
discuss the contexts in which nudges are
likely to be most useful and also highlight
some potential pitfalls with this policy-
making approach. I also discuss the ethics
of nudge politics, particularly when poli-
cies are designed to maximize collective,
rather than individual, benefits and do not
therefore fit the concept of paternalism.
In several cases, the behavior change
produced by the nudge may not produce
the desired policy outcome. This is espe-
cially likely when the desired outcome
involves a series of repeated decisions
that are made in different contexts other
than that in which the nudge is imple-
mented. Consider nudges surrounding
food choices. Rising levels of obesity, and
the associated population health implica-
tions, are key policy issues for govern-
ments worldwide (Just and Payne, 2009).
Several nudges have been designed which
can encourage healthier food choices in
specific scenarios. For example, designat-
ing a larger area of the supermarket trolley
for fruit and vegetables, or increasing the
prominence of healthy food items in cafe-
terias, can encourage consumers to select
more of these items (Marteau et al., 2011).
However, it is currently unclear whether
people who are nudged to make health-
ier food choices in the supermarket or
the cafeteria continue to make healthier
food choices in future situations, when
they are not nudged. While advocates may
not claim that nudges are a panacea for
positive behavior change, there is a dan-
ger that some nudges may produce nega-
tive spillover effects, which risks bringing
about the opposite outcome to that which
was intended. For example, one study
has shown that low-fat labels on food—
another method used to promote health-
ier food choices—can actually increase
caloric intake because consumers experi-
ence reduced consumption guilt (Wansink
and Chandon, 2006). Nudges may be
more likely to achieve the desired policy
outcome when the outcome in question
involves just one key decision, as is the case
with encouraging participation in organ
donor schemes or adding loft insulation
to improve household energy efficiency.
In these cases, nudges aimed at eliciting a
specific decision in a specific context also
simultaneously produce the desired out-
come. Where outcomes are dependent on
a series of decisions, policy makers should
be aware that behavior change may be lim-
ited to a specific context or, worse that
the nudgemay produce negative spillovers,
thereby negating some or all of the positive
impact of the initial behavior change.
The efficacy of interventions may vary
across contexts: what works well in one sit-
uation or with one group of people may
be of limited use in different settings or
with different cultural groups. For exam-
ple, consider behavior change in the con-
text of energy use. Data collected on over 6
million US households by the energy com-
pany, Opower, has shown that consumers
can be encouraged to use less energy if
they are given feedback about how their
energy use compares with that of similar
sized households in their neighborhood,
together with tacit approval or disapproval
in the form of an emoticon. These mes-
sages on the energy bill, together with
suggestions of how to reduce energy use,
have been shown to reduce energy con-
sumption by around 2% (Allcott, 2011).
However, the efficacy of this normative
feedback varies with other factors, such
as country and political ideology. Similar
interventions used in the UK produced
greater reductions in energy consump-
tion than in the US (Dolan and Metcalfe,
2012, working paper), while another study
showed that US households with polit-
ically liberal ideology were more likely
than conservative households to reduce
energy use in response to normative feed-
back (Costa and Kahn, 2013). These find-
ings suggest that targeted nudges may be
most effective at producing widespread
behavioral change (Costa and Kahn, 2013)
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although such approaches are not yet
widely used.
Another potential problem with nudge
politics is that we don’t yet know whether
these interventions will work in the long
term. This concern is particularly acute
when nudges seek to produce outcomes
which involve a series of behavioral deci-
sions, as in the energy use example above.
Reassuringly, evidence collected over a 5-
year period indicates that the efficacy of
this particular nudge does not attenuate;
instead, consumers apparently form new
consumption habits and actually reduce
energy use further over time. The study
does show, however, that intermittent
reinforcement of the behavior with the
nudge is important. In households where
the treatment was stopped, energy use
began to climb back up to pre-treatment
levels (Allcott and Rogers, 2012, working
paper).
Finally, the ethics of nudge poli-
tics are not clear cut (Hansen and
Jespersen, 2013). The moral justifica-
tion for nudges, according to Thaler and
Sunstein (2003), rests on the assumption
that they are paternalistic, or designed
to make choosers better off, as judged
by themselves. In reality, however, many
nudges appear designed to maximize col-
lective benefits (see Table 1 for examples).
In many situations, individual and col-
lective interests are misaligned such that
producing the collective benefit requires
the nudged individuals to pay upfront
costs. Determining whether such nudges
are morally defensible is a key chal-
lenge for policy-makers. I suggest that
policy-makers may defend the use of
non-paternalistic nudges if the nudged
individual stands to share in the collective
benefits that are produced. For example,
one of the most famous examples of a suc-
cessful nudge is the “presumed consent”
model for organ donation. Requiring par-
ticipants to opt-out, rather than opt-in,
to organ donor schemes effectively dou-
bled the number of consenting donors in
one study (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003).
Crucially, nudged individuals do not ben-
efit from being nudged onto the organ
donor list. Nevertheless, these individuals
do share the collective benefit, in terms
Table 1 | Ethical hierarchy for policymakers when designing and implementing nudges.
Category of Nudge Initial payoff to nudged
individual
Collective payoff Nudged individual shares collective
benefit?
1. PATERNALISTIC POSITIVE POSITIVE YES
Example: Promote healthy eating by making
healthy food options more prominent in
cafeterias.
Health may be improved. Less public money spent on
obesity related problems.
Reduced public spending in one area
frees up money for spending in
another area.
Similar nudges designed to:
Improve individual health or survival, e.g., behaviors relating to smoking, alcohol use, exercise; sexual behavior; seat belt use.
Improve personal finance, e.g., join pension saving plans, on-time credit card repayments; help jobseekers find work; implement energy savings.
2. NON-PATERNALISTIC—TYPE A NEGATIVE (OR NO
COST)
POSITIVE YES
Example: Reduce antibiotic use by
encouraging GPs to prescribe alternatives for
minor ailments.






Less likely to be infected with an
antibiotic-resistant strain of infection.
Similar nudges designed to:
Improve population health, e.g., increased vaccination uptake, increased participation in organ donor schemes.
Increase tax compliance.
Encourage costly environmental protection behavior, e.g., reusing hotel towels, reducing littering, increasing recycling.
Increase employee effort.
3. NON-PATERNALISTIC—TYPE B NEGATIVE POSITIVE NO
Example: Increase charitable donations by
enrolling employees into an opt-out scheme of
donations.
Financial cost. Recipients benefit from the
donation.
Individual that donates does not share
in the benefits.
Policymakers should consider the payoffs of behavior change that accrue to nudged individuals and to others that are also affected. The currencies of the payoffs
may vary according to the nudge in question, for example financial nudges produce monetary payoffs whereas health nudges produce payoffs that may be esti-
mated in terms of risk of illness or disease. Paternalistic nudges create the least challenging ethical dilemmas for policymakers, although some non-paternalistic
nudges which create collective benefits that also accrue to the nudged individual (type A) may also be morally defensible. Non-paternalistic nudges which require
an individual to pay a cost but share in none of the benefits (type B) are morally dubious and should be used with caution.
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of increased organs available for donation
which they might 1 day need.
Nudges which require individuals to
pay upfront costs without the opportu-
nity to share in the collective benefit
are morally dubious. For example, the
UK Behavioural Insights Team has sug-
gested that individuals could be nudged
into more regular and generous charita-
ble donations by using opt-out models
to automatically enrol staff into work-
place giving schemes (UK Behavioural
Insights Team, 2013). While the aim of
nudges to increase charitable donations
is clearly laudable, we should think care-
fully before endorsing interventions which
impose costs on one set of individuals (the
donors) to provide benefits to another set
of individuals (the recipients). Implicit in
the acceptance of such an arrangement is
the notion that it is morally defensible to
prioritize the welfare of one group of indi-
viduals over the welfare of another group.
While such a stance may be acceptable
from a moral perspective under certain
conditions (for example, where the benefit
of receiving aid to the recipient group far
outweighs the cost to the donors) it is cru-
cial for policy-makers to stipulate precisely
when this is the case.
To conclude, nudge policies have the
potential to generate improvements in
individuals’ health, wealth and happiness
for relatively small financial investments. I
have highlighted a few areas where policy-
makers should exercise caution, however.
Specifically, the effect of nudges on behav-
ior may be context specific. As such,
policy-makers should be careful not to
equate an observed change in behavior
in one context with the desired policy
outcome, which may depend on behav-
ior change in several disparate contexts.
In a similar vein, it would also be useful
to know more about the long-term effects
of behavioral interventions. On an ethical
note, I argue that nudges which produce
collective, rather than individual, benefits
do not properly fit the concept of paternal-
ism. Nevertheless, such nudges may often
be morally defensible if the nudged indi-
vidual can share in the collective benefits
produced.
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